Friday, December 20, 2013

Primer Sindicato en Amazon dentro de los EE UU? (BusinessWeek)

Unions

Amazon May Get Its First Labor Union in the U.S.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Thursday, December 19, 2013

Economía Global: Quién es el Jefe en Nor-Korea? (BusinessWeek)

Global Economics
On Anniversary of Dad's Death, Kim Jong Un Shows Who's Boss
 

Friday, December 13, 2013

La Economía Global: Está en retirada el Libre Comercio? (BusinessWeek)

Farewell to the Age of Free Trade
By


Since the end of World War II and the birth of the modern global economy, business leaders have come to accept an iron law: International trade always expands faster than economic growth. Between the late 1940s and 2013, that assumption held true. Trade grew roughly twice as fast as the world economy annually, as fresh markets opened up, governments signed free-trade pacts, new industries and consumers emerged, and technological advances made international trade cheaper and faster.
 
Now this iron law may be crumbling. Over the past two years, international trade has grown so slowly that it has fallen behind the growth of the world economy, which itself is hardly humming. Major potential trade deals, such as the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between Europe and North America, are at risk of falling through. At an early December meeting in Bali, representatives of the 159 members of the World Trade Organization agreed to move forward with basic trade facilitation measures but failed to reach any consensus on what should be on the table for the next WTO round, instead just deferring action on substantial items.
 
Despite such worrying trends, many economists and trade specialists seem unfazed. In its latest research report, HSBC (HSBC) predicted that global trade will continue expanding by about 8 percent annually for the next two decades, outstripping the world’s economic expansion.
 
Such optimism is misplaced. Expectations that emerging markets could boom for decades haven’t come true. Advances in technology over the past five years have facilitated the rise of state capitalism and made it easier for companies to stay in their borders. And unlike at just about any time in the past six decades, the political leadership of almost every major economy is weak, making it easier for protectionism to flourish. The era of free trade as the world has known it is dangerously close to coming to an end.
 
The belief that trade flows would inevitably increase was based on two assumptions: Emerging markets still had huge space to expand, and new technologies would make businesses more interconnected. These ideas still power reports such as HSBC’s forecast. But they appear to be wrong. Today’s technological advances don’t necessarily lead to economic integration. The latest breakthrough in manufacturing, 3D printing, makes it easier for companies to keep their design and initial production work in-house and cut out suppliers—which reduces trade, because it removes incentives to outsource later rounds of manufacturing overseas. The coming breakthrough in many science-based industries—such as synthetic biology, in which living forms are created from strands of DNA—will similarly create pressure for companies to keep operations in-house. Already, many corporations are coming home: Cross-border investment inflows fell by 18 percent in 2012 and probably will drop again in 2013.
 
Far from creating a long tail, globalization and the Internet have instead made economies of scale more important to companies’ survival. That has prompted consolidation in industries from telecommunications to oil to mining, allowing many of these industries to become dominated by giant state-owned companies from countries such as China, Russia, and Brazil. These state-owned enterprises are hardly forces for free trade: They often crush entrepreneurs in their own societies, and they often push for protectionist barriers, not against them.
 
As for the big emerging markets, they aren’t proving as resilient as expected, despite their huge consumer classes. China’s economy has slowed only marginally, but every other major emerging economy, from India to Brazil, has seen its growth drop precipitously the past two years. (When all the figures were finally in and calculated this summer, it turned out that Brazil’s economy grew by only 0.9 percent in 2012, far less than Brazilian leaders and economists had forecast.)
 
Many of these, such as India, have based their hopes for growth on services, not the export-oriented manufacturing that enriched Japan and the Asian tiger economies—and before them Britain, the U.S., and other countries. As economists Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze note, services not only employ fewer people than manufacturing, but they also face far more trade barriers by developed nations than manufactured exports.
 
These challenges might be surmountable if a stronger international consensus in favor of free trade existed. Over the past 60 years, at least one major economy was able to take the lead in advancing the global trade agenda. Today, however, every prominent trading economy is too consumed by problems at home. Weakened by the shaky rollout of health-care reform, President Obama faces a hostile Congress that has little inclination to support either the administration’s proposed free-trade agreement with Asia, called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or a U.S.-European trade pact. China’s top leaders are still trying to consolidate power and address domestic challenges such as land reform.
 
Britain is consumed with austerity, Japan is embarking on contentious economic reforms, and Germany is constrained by its history and Berlin’s consensual politics. Reports of U.S. spying on top European leaders have caused politicians across the European Union—already skeptical of a trans-Atlantic trade zone because of concerns that many European industries would be swamped—to call for trade negotiations with the U.S. to be cut off. As of early December, negotiations have resumed, but the prospects for a deal remain highly uncertain.
 

 Kurlantzick is Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of the new book, Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government.

Monday, December 9, 2013

Los Horribles Números detrás de la TV por Cable (BusinessWeek)

If you’re a cable TV subscriber who grumbles about paying for dozens of channels your family never watches, a media analyst has a message: That cable bundle carries all sorts of unseen benefits.
In a report that attempts to quantify the costs of an à la carte pricing for cable television, Needham & Co.’s Laura Martin estimates that $45 billion of TV advertising would be at risk under such a change, along with 1.4 million jobs, $20 billion in taxes paid by such cable operators as Comcast (CMCSA) and Time Warner Cable (TWC), and $117 billion in market capitalization. And maybe you wouldn’t miss the Christian-themed Smile of a Child channel or Jewelry Television, but if you love any of those niche networks you could almost certainly kiss them goodbye for lack of financial support.

The notion of “unbundling” cable television packages and allowing consumers to choose only those channels they want has long tantalized frustrated subscribers, who pay about $720 per year in the U.S. for an average of 180 channels. The average viewer watches somewhere from 16 to 20 of those, according to Needham, and the gap infuriates millions as they write monthly checks to cable companies.

Martin argues in her report this week that à la carte pricing would lead to higher TV bills: “The notion of creating value through unbundling may be a laudable goal from a public policy point of view, but the world this premise describes can never exist.” That’s mainly because for every $1 of subscriber revenue, advertisers pay $1.24. Those payments totaled $101 billion last year, and $56 billion came from advertisers.

To keep the average cable roster of 180 channels, U.S. households would need to pay $1,260 yearly—or 75 percent more than they do now. But, wait, you say, the entire goal would be to pare that 180 drastically, down to the 15 or 20 I care to watch. Unfortunately, this is where the economics of the industry wallop an unbundler’s best-laid plans: The average annual cost to program a cable channel is $280 million, according to Needham’s math, and it’s way more for those that carry sports. Consumers tend to name an ideal price of $30 per month for just those few channels they want, according to Needham’s surveys. Across the 104 million U.S. homes with cable, that amounts to $37 billion per year.

Only 28 percent of current channels would survive in such a world—or about 50 channels in total. “Worst case,” Martin writes, “if distributors (who collect all the money) kept the first $30 billion (as they did in 2012), that would leave only $7 billion for content, implying only 7 percent of channels would survive and 173 channels would disappear.”

What about advertising? That revenue would still exist but only for the most-watched channels, such as Fox News (FOXA)AMC (AMCX) and A&E, where Duck Dynasty has ruled cable-TV ratings. What Martin calls “passion channels” like Discovery’s (DISCA)Military Channel would, in all likelihood, not have meaningful advertising funds and would disappear, taking the massive bundle paradigm with them.

This math exercise doesn’t translate to any kind of real-world channel bundles a cable TV company would ever try to sell, given their enormous cost structures and the fact that ESPN (DIS) alone has some nine permutations. (So far.) Yet the overall “ecosystem” of Big Cable remains a lucrative market for both content creators and distributors, their periodic fighting over money notwithstanding.
While unbundling cable may not work economically, the Needham report does suggest one solution for people disenchanted over paying for all those unwatched channels: Cut the cord, keep your modem, and stream the shows you like from Hulu, Amazon (AMZN), or Netflix (NFLX). Says Martin: “That’s how capitalism works.”
Bachman is an associate editor for Businessweek.com.